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It may seem rather obvious to state that: “Poor law waslaw”; nevertheless, this basic legal truth has slippedfrom the consciousness of those researching and
publishing nationally and internationally on the history of
welfare in England and Wales. As a result of this slippage, the
legal underpinnings of that system of relieving poverty have
been marginalised, misunderstood, denied and forgotten.
Although most current welfare textbooks make reference to
welfare’s poor law past, few acknowledge that England and
Wales (Scotland and Ireland have a different welfare history)
possess the oldest continuous surviving legal system of
welfare relief in Europe; a 400-year-old common law (later
public law) locally funded and administered system of
relieving poverty. This positive cultural norm deserves
celebrating. In addition, the weight of such a socio-legal
history ensures that many echoes of that past resonate in
modern welfare law. In particular, these comprise elements
of localism and an acceptance, albeit sometimes grudgingly
by both governments and citizens, that the poor will be
relieved of poverty. These aspects predate the modern
British Welfare State by hundreds of years.  
One consequence of this neglect, the “forgotten” of the title,
is that many scholars are unaware of the extent of those legal
foundations that ensured poor law was not simply local
custom developing over time. Rather, those legal aspects of
poor law discussed in this book became entrenched within
society creating long term, if often unrecognised, legal
norms. The most significant of these, discussed more fully
throughout the book, is the largely forgotten, often denied
and hence underestimated legal right to relief. Such is the
level of “forgetting” that this book’s fundamental assertion,
that poor law encompasses a legal right to relief, remains
controversial as counter to current orthodoxy amongst
historians. In consequence, their denial of this right has been
followed in academic legal texts. However, in chapter 3 this
book sets out detailed legal “proofs”, supported by archival
and other research, to reveal those legal obligations, rights
and duties that underpin and explain all poor law activities. 
On one level, this book is a legal opinion that the “law of
settlement and removal” is at the heart of the poor law, that
its doctrines encompass rights, duties and obligations by all
citizens of England and Wales and that the settled poor
possessed a legal right to relief in and from their place of
settlement. This conclusion emerges from research
conducted in two dimensions. The first is concerned with
small stories, micro-histories of ordinary people and how
they experienced law. Additionally, the work reconstructs
law’s pervasiveness, its theoretical and doctrinal nature,
development and influences. Such an approach, involving
often-contradictory methodologies destabilises an
orthodox approach to legal history, hence the title of this
work is a socio-legal rather than a social or legal history. 
The second (parallel) dimension of the book constitutes a
revisionist reconstruction of current orthodox
interpretations of poor law’s history, particularly in chapter
4, in order to [re]place a legal right correctly within its
historical framework. In addition, other chapters of the
work trace those contemporary juristic and contingent
elements that have contributed to poor law historians
adopting an incorrect legal stance. Further chapters
reconstruct poor law’s legal past from a number of
perspectives; that of reformers, protestors, the excluded,
those who administer relief and those who receive it.  
In adopting a socio-legal approach, this work demonstrates
that poor law histories and empirical research, viewed
through the lens of law, fully substantiate the existence of a
right to relief.  This remains so even where historians
themselves believe that they are revealing cultural or
political patterns of social negotiation and not a legal
framework. Finally, it is important to underline that despite
much resonance and some survivals, poor law is not the
same as modern welfare law. That consists of public
administrative law operating within a central bureaucratic
framework funded by a system of national taxation and
directed by whichever government is currently in power.
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On the contrary, as is explored within the work, until 1865
and in some aspects beyond, “poor law” constitutes an
over-arching common law legal “system” that also
encompasses local autonomy, local financial obligations,
duties and responsibilities with ad hoc relief patterns.
Within this “system” the localities manifest individual
characteristics according to amongst other factors, local
financial, social and property-owning circumstances. 
However, all local parishes share two common elements:
first, that the Justices at Sessions annually ratify and thus
supervise those poor law activities; and second, that all
relief decisions are made in the context of a legal
framework comprising the common law of settlement and
removal, the right to relief, other legal “rules” and
established legal processes. This is not that “legal” model
of exclusion, control and “undeserving” that is increasingly
popular as an academic reading of poor law; rather it
reveals a complex, nuanced and sophisticated system based
upon rights. 
This is, of course, not the final word; in challenging
conventional non-legal assumptions about poor law the
writer wishes to re-open a closed discussion. It is timely to
refocus both lawyers and historians’ intellectual attention
upon those rights-based elements that socio-legal research
reveals as a fundamental element of welfare’s past. For
their part, historians have concentrated on discovering the
nature, operation and changing social impact of the poor
law from those legal records held in archives rather than
undertaking legal reconstructions. Their “law” discussions
are largely constructed around a narrative account of
statutes sourced from the work of other historians, often
traceable to the negative perceptions found in the Webbs’
poor law histories, not legal texts. The overall effect
explains why the legal history of poor law often repels
historians; but it is considerably more than: “one damn
statute after another.”
In spite of these comments, this absence of legal
knowledge does not represent academic failure. It is rather
a manifestation of a lack of “law mindedness”; no different
from that “history blindness” afflicting many legal
academics. This lack however, does partially explain why so
many historians deny the existence of a legal right to relief.
Of course this writer acknowledges that historians produce
detailed and scholarly analyses, derived from study
undertaken within an abundance of surviving poor law
archival materials. Paradoxically, the explanation for the
continued survival of those records is found in their legal
nature, that they record poor law legal duties, rights and
responsibilities. In consequence, both the existence and
survival of these archives are evidence of the power and
significance of that overarching framework of substantive
legal rules surrounding the relief of poverty.
More specifically, at base all these records owe their origins
to three legal imperatives contained within poor law.  Firstly,
every parish and vestry in England and Wales had a legal
duty to raise a rate to maintain its poor under the authority
of the terms of an Act for the Better Relief of the Poor 1601.
The second, a complex common law presumption
underpinning that Act and so understood and expressed in
all subsequent case law and explored within the book, was
that every person born in England and Wales possessed a
settlement somewhere. In consequence, in that place a
settled person was legally entitled to relief if destitute. This
precise geographical place could only be established via legal
interpretation of the “rules” and precedents contained
within the law of settlement and removal. Some aspects of
that settlement entitlement were first expressed in statute in
1662. However, the settlement entitlement has an earlier
common law existence explored in chapter 3. 
The third imperative was that a poor person could only be
removed to their settlement parish by operation of formal
legal process and if they appeared likely to (before 1795)
or actually sought poor relief. Thus, it was not social
altruism or “custom” that motivated the provision of poor
relief, rather long-standing legal “rules.” In short,
underpinning all poor law documents recording the
activities of officials administering the system, setting and
collecting a poor rate, recording details of those relieved,
indeed the very system of welfare itself, is the legal right of
the settled poor to relief when destitute. 
From a lawyer’s perspective it appears perverse that this
legal “truth”, constantly attested to in case law and stated
within contemporary legal texts and justices’ manuals, is
rejected by historians and thus “lost” to legal and other
academics who follow their lead. The book aims to
undermine this incorrect yet persistent stance. One
possible explanation for that law-blindness (others are
explored within the book) may be found in the influence of
those reforms implemented via the terms of the Poor Law
Amendment Act 1834. This initiated the new poor law,
born of Benthamite positivism and Whiggish reformist
theories of political economy. The birth of this baby
heralded the arrival of the hated new poor law with its
national system of prison-like workhouses. Although
settlement law remained after 1834, as did the right to
relief, the manner of that relief became bureaucratised
according to the terms of the Act and was only to be
available in a Union workhouse. Consequentially, the poor
are characterised as a problem to be contained, controlled
and stigmatised out of their state of poverty. This direction
cast the die for English welfare, pathologising poverty and
may have served to further influence historians’ rejection
of the existence of legal rights possessed by the poor.
What is more; so influential and pervasive are the negative
social effects of those reforms that a cultural stigma
surrounding poverty persists today despite the
establishment of the Welfare State in 1948. The book’s
various chapters discuss how elements of that “new poor
law” mind-set personified and promoted negative
assumptions and presumptions concerning the poor and
the role of welfare. Such persistent deformations, 17
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dichotomising welfare values, represent a problem that
continues to profoundly affect the modern application of
welfare law, thus forming part of the inspiration for this
book. For this reason, the work is not intended as a study
of an historical curiosity but rather an exploration of when,
how and why such negativity arose and how it continues to
hold sway despite the “abolition” of the last of those hated
poor law remnants by the Beveridge reforms. In
consequence of that past, the horrors of the post 1834
poor law system are well known, although not those
positive rights-based aspects whose origins lie much earlier. 
This book suggests that there are additional factors that
continue to influence current mis-understanding of
welfare’s legal past. The first is the persistence of that
negative ideology prevalent within the Webbs’ poor law
histories prompted by their political agenda that downplays
any positive aspects of the poor law. Their works remain
influential and although subsequently criticised remain part
of poor law orthodoxy for many scholars, both in Britain
and elsewhere. The second is that the “abolition” of poor
law in 1948, ostensibly swept away by the new broom of
Beveridge, left a message that nothing in welfare’s past had
value for society and the poor. The third is a result of that
legal abolition; namely that poor law as a legal subject
disappeared from legal practice and legal memory. All these
factors compound the “forgetting” of the significance of
that rights basis to the poor law.
That neglected, lost aspect of poor law’s history is the focal
point of the book. This “forgetting” or minimising of a
legal, enforceable right to relief derived from, and located
within the possession of a legal settlement, has led
historians seriously to underestimate its significance within
the lived experience of the poor. As a result, a “history of
poverty” has developed which does not take into account
the power and legal formality of that right; or at best,
seriously underestimates its significance for the poor, local
ratepayers and those who administered the system. This
book aims to redress that imbalance, combining social and
legal history. In consequence, it is one reply to that
rhetorical question posed by Richard Evans: “what has law
to say to history?” This writer suggests that for poor law
studies at least, viewing welfare’s past through the lens of
law opens other windows to that past to disclose an
alternative landscape. An examination of its topography
reveals that poor law was law, that a legal framework
informs all poor law activity and that there was a common
law right to relief. Such a right enforceable in person, as we
shall see, is precious indeed and deser ves to be
remembered and celebrated. Its existence reminds us that
human rights are not a creation of modernity and that the
common law has protected personal rights throughout its
long history.
The emergence of common law poor law may be
technically dated from the Act of 1601, which constitutes
the legal authority for all poor relief in England and Wales
until 1948 and is so expressed in all case law. That Act may
be read partially as innovative but it also embodies those
legal presumptions underpinning those poor law statutes
enacted during the previous seventy post-Reformation
years, a topic more fully explored in the book. There are
three points of legal interest; the first is that the obligation
by each parish to relieve is “understood” as in earlier
statutes but is not articulated; it is the financial and
administrative issues that are detailed. The second, who is
to be relieved, is also “understood” and partly set out in
the earlier statutes; that is a person born in the parish, or
who has resided there for three years, this constitutes the
settlement entitlement. Finally, in its terms this Act clones
the ecclesiastical parish into a civil parish, whose residents
are instructed to annually appoint unpaid parish officials to
administer the poor law; marking the birth of English local
government. Thus two discrete legal bodies, one secular
one ecclesiastical each with their own specific functions
and responsibilities, co-exist in one parish, comprising the
same individuals in the same geographical place. 
The terms of the 1601 Act emphasise the civil administrative
aspects of poor law. In brief, each parish is responsible for
raising a poor rate from each resident householder (it is
eventually established that this will be based upon the value
of the property they occupy) according to local financial
need. This rate is set annually taking into account any money
in hand and any parish debt outstanding from the previous
year’s expenses; it is demand-led and uncapped. Parish
lands, charities and any other parish income are factored into
this total, which is to be presented to and ratified annually by
the Justices at Sessions. To sum up, each householder in a
parish or township has a legal obligation to contribute to the
poor rate and failure to pay leads to the seizure of goods and
imprisonment until full payment is made; as for its modern
descendant, the Local Council Tax. Finally, this structure of
poor relief administered by local vestries composed of
ratepayers, funded by a local rate and supervised by Justices,
now constitutes a poor law system operating under the
common law. Admittedly this “system” is not initially fully
operational, nor in any way resembles modern centrally
supervised welfare bureaucracies. Nevertheless, it constitutes
all the necessary legal and administrative elements that will
underpin and provide legal authority for poor relief for the
next three hundred and fifty years. 
The book details the prior legal existence of the settlement
entitlement and those new terms contained in the 1662
Act. These confirm that the settled poor of any place are
entitled to a share of the poor rate and add details of how
settlement is acquired. The residence qualification set out
in the terms of early post-Reformation statutes is
shortened to “40 days at the least.” This Act formalises the
legal status of possessing a settlement, and is so understood
in all subsequent case law. Settlement is now established as
a legal right possessed by a settled individual who has an
enforceable legal claim to a share of the poor rate when
destitute. In addition, the Act is concerned with the
removal of those poor not possessing a settlement in the
place where they live. This removal is achieved by the
Order of any two Justices of the Peace upon a complaint
made by the overseers of the poor or churchwardens of any
parish within 40 days of the poor person arriving in their
parish. However, the Removal Order can only be made to
a specific named parish where the Justices are satisfied,
from legal proofs, the pauper possesses a settlement. There
was a right of appeal by that named parish to Quarter
Sessions, only on the grounds that the poor person did not
possess a settlement in their parish or for procedural
errors. These appeals could continue, and often did to the
highest level; over time creating many thousands of
settlement cases in the Law Reports, (noting that aside
from rating matters a differentiated legal subject, poor law
precedents are concerned with settlement issues). In short,
under the terms and legal authority of the 1662 Act, a
formal legal process evolved for asking and answering the
settlement questions. This was based upon that
fundamental legal presumption, that every person born in
England and Wales possesses a settlement somewhere.  
To summarise, in its earliest form settlement as a common
law right was acquired simply through birth or residence.
However, gaining and proving a legal settlement became an
increasingly technical matter. This law continued to evolve
from those terms both introduced and “understood” in
the 1662 Act, via further amending statutes and developing
case law, to become extremely complex and a major source
of contemporary lawyers’ incomes. The proportion and
volume of income generated by settlement issues was
equivalent to that earned from British criminal law practice
today. Chapter 6 provides a settlement “case study” to
illustrate some aspects of that doctrinal law.
Settlement law thus protects and delineates legal status and
an individual could only be settled in one specific
geographical place. The acquisition of settled status
elsewhere automatically destroyed the previous settlement
and the responsibility for maintaining that person then lay
with the new settlement parish. Any person could
exchange their place of settlement for another via the
qualifying rules for each head of settlement. A woman
acquires her husband’s settlement upon marriage, a
family’s settlement always follows the father’s settlement
and thus they were removed as a unit by one legal action,
although it became a requirement that the name and age of
each member so removed should appear upon the face of
the Order. Individuals who had qualifying status acquired a
settlement wherever they resided. Anyone, including the
“better sort” could be removed by legal process if they
became destitute and had not acquired a settlement in the
removing parish.
In order to access aid a poor person would approach a
parish official, usually but not exclusively the overseer, to
request aid; noting that “pauper” was a legal term for a
person actually in receipt of poor relief. The first legal
requirement was to demonstrate that they were destitute,
and satisfying this requirement lay within the subjective
judgement of individual parish officials. However, if the
poor person possessed a settlement in the parish, no
matter what the official decided, that parish had a legal
obligation to relieve the poor person when destitute.
Therefore, if relief is refused the Justices may make an
Order to compel payment if they conclude that parish
officers have improperly refused. Such an Order could be
obtained by a poor person upon personal application to the
Justices, thus allowing the individual further opportunity to
demonstrate their destitution. This is not an appeals
procedure; on the contrary it represents a long-standing
personal right that was eventually given a procedural
formality in the terms of an Act of 1714. Parish officials are
now bound to assist the pauper and obey the magistrate’s
Order, failure to do so is contempt of court and the
overseer incurs a personal liability. 
The legal authority of the Acts of 1601 and 1662 remained
in place after the reforms implemented under the terms of
the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834. Chapters 2 and 9 of
the book examine contemporary theories that influenced
the form these took and those aspects of reform that
directly impinged upon the legal rights of the poor. For the
poor themselves, the terms of the 1834 Act had one major
effect; that is the manner in which the relief to which they
were still entitled would be provided. The draconian
sections of the Act declared that the able bodied poor
could only be relieved in a workhouse in regimented
prison-like conditions. This was accompanied by the
abolition of a poor person’s right to seek an Order from a
Justice for relief payments; in future Justices may only
order relief in kind, and that solely in an emergency (s 54).
This section did not abolish the right to relief for the
settled poor, as that constitutes the legal foundations of,
and explanation for, poor relief provision. Furthermore,
the continuing legal authority of the 1601 Act permitted
many parishes (and poor law unions) to exercise their legal
discretion and pay out-relief to the poor (chapter 3).
However, if relief must be given, as indeed it must but now
in the workhouse, then this new poor law system was
intended to control that relief, to begin to move control
away from the localities and introduce discipline and
efficiency by grafting elements of bureaucratic proto-
modernism onto a quasi-medieval survival. 
It is difficult to imagine how great a loss these reforms
represented for the poor; however there is sufficient
evidence of poor law protest and resistance to show how
bitterly this loss of legal rights was resented, a matter
reconstructed within the book (chapter 9). Those reforms
ensured that destitution increasingly became a route into
the new union workhouses for many. 
CONCLUSION
It is patent that the workhouse and the [new] poor law
have become a part of Britain’s “heritage” to the extent
that the National Trust have restored Southwell Poor Law
Union, Nottinghamshire for public enjoyment. 19
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Underpinning that heritage, bringing a frisson of vicarious
empathy to Southwell’s paying visitors, lies the social
stigma and fear surrounding the new poor law, creating a
cultural norm that survives and continues to influence
aspects of modern welfare provision. It is that norm which
influenced a desire for reform leading to the Beveridge Report
of 1942.  This in turn produced the modern welfare state,
but modern welfare is disconnected from those original
poor law personal rights, duties and obligations protected
and enforced under the law of settlement and removal.
There was and is no revival of the personal right to relief
once possessed by the settled poor. This is unsurprising, for
that right has been consistently undervalued, marginalised,
denied and forgotten. 
Reconstructing poor law’s legal past illuminates the
existence of that earlier culture of legal rights, their nature
and their value to the poor. This is not to minimise the
subjective elements in the amounts and manner poor relief
was given, nor to deny that proving destitution allowed
discretion to parish officials; elements today understood as
“conditionality” (chapter 8). This antinomy operates to
conceal those positive elements embedded within an entire
legal structure with enforcement and sanctions to protect
the right to relief. In this context the book proposes
(chapter 8) that both government and local responses in
Ireland during the Great Famine of the 1840s illustrate
how little relief might have been given to the poor in
England and Wales without those legal rights protected by
the settlement entitlement. Irish poor law was
implemented under the terms of the Poor Relief (Ireland)
Act 1838, which introduced a financially capped scheme
and specifically excluded the right to relief.
In summary, Welfare’s Forgotten Past concludes that
historians have fallen into legal error in their consensus
that there was no legal right to relief; an orthodoxy of
denial arrived at by consulting each other and not the law
and legal rules. The book retraces the route by which
historians arrived at their legally incorrect conclusions and
reconstructs a socio-legal alternate version of poor law
history; one that demonstrates the doctrinal existence of
the right to relief and provides a technical legal opinion to
that effect, supported by the relevant legal authorities
(chapter 3). This is accompanied by historical
reconstructions of various aspects of poor law now
factoring in that legal right to relief (chapters 5 and 7).
Finally, the book concludes that there are three locations
where that right is consistently in evidence; the first is
within legal texts and the case law, rarely consulted and
consistently mis-cited. The second is within those local
vestry records that reveal centuries of uncontested
unquestioned relief payments for the destitute settled
poor; their significance has been consistently marginalised,
misconstrued or undervalued in historical reconstructions.
The third and final location is within the words and actions
of the poor in support of their [legal] rights; fully attested
and reconstructed within numerous poor law histories.
Unfortunately, because those historians have taken a
position of denial, the poor have not been understood. 
As such, for the discipline of history and for welfare law
scholars who rely on works produced from within that
discipline, this work is a revisionist text; in particular as it
proposes that social histories of the poor law have
compounded error by failing to provide legally accurate
accounts of that past. It follows, that those who remain in
denial concerning the legal nature of the right to relief,
including historians, lawyers and policy-makers, necessarily
focus on the relief of poverty as a gift of the state; recording
a past where the poor exist to be judged, “improved” or
watched constantly for fraud. This negativity, co-existing
with a system of welfare provision based originally upon a
legal obligation to relieve the poor, produced and continues
to produce an operative tension, a fundamental antinomy.
Welfare’s current incarnation continues elements of that
400 year old legal responsibility to aid the poor having also
absorbed elements of the post-1834 bureaucratic negative
cultural norm that mistrusts the poor.
This current state of affairs is also problematic for North
American welfare, where a version of the English poor law
system was transplanted into the new colonial British
settlements. “Forgetting” continues as welfare studies
published within Britain and the USA specifically
reconstruct poor law origins to authenticate welfare
scholarship, but rely upon those accounts that persistently
and inaccurately deny the existence of the legal right to
relief. In consequence, as much as historical
reconstructions enrich our understanding of how law is
experienced in the past, it is still a requirement that we as
lawyers test legal conclusions, or conclusions concerning
law, with legal techniques. Such is the contribution law may
bring to broader scholarship. This is not simply a matter of
interdisciplinary angst for, as this book argues, “forgetting”
the existence and importance of the legal right to relief
continues to deform understanding of the development of
the British and American welfare systems. The point is not
just that we carry that past with us, but that for the relief
of poverty, that past is being reconstructed and
subsequently mined for answers and solutions to current
political and legal problems surrounding poverty and
welfare. This writer suggests we listen to those poor who
spoke of rights and meant law; we owe it to their current
successors in poverty.
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